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448 COURTELL 1' l\Icl~ACHEN 
the <·otwlu1'ion that the informer either did not <:xisl 
or was not reliable. Obviouc;l.v, defemhmi sn<·eeedr~<l. 
at in r::reating a eontliet i11 the evidenr·c for the trial r:ouri 
to and the eourt was entitled to belieYf' Xoel and to 
determine that the comnnmieation in question was in faei 
made by an informer known to Noel as ,James Allen and that, 
in view of the informer past reliability, there was reasonabl(• 
r:ause for the arrest and search. 
\Vhat has been said above makes it nnneeessary to eonsider 
defe11daut 's claim that the information allegedly giv<~ll by 
Handolph Clark eannot be relied upon to justify the seareh 
and seiznre beeause Noel learned of it indirectly through ln-
spedor Ohlson, who did not testify. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Carter, ,J., Traynor, .J., Sehauer, ,J., Spenee, .J., 
an<l ~\]f.('omb, .J., <oOIH·urred. 
[L. A. :\o. 34383. In Bank. Feb. 2, 1959.] 
])0:'\\'A .JEAN COUH'l'ELL, a Minor, ete., Hespondent, v. 
HAZ~JL lVL .l\IcEACilEN et al., Appellants. 
[la, lb] Negligence-- Instructions-Contributory Negligence-In-
fants.--Jn an action for injuries sustained by a 5-year ami 
9-month-old girl when her elothing took fire allegPdly from live 
embers of a fire left unattended on defendants' lot, an instrue-
tion given by the court on its own motion that thrre was no 
contributory nPgligence on plaintiff's part erroneously deprived 
defendants of a defense on which they relied, where it was not 
warrantPd on Hll)' of the following theories: (1) that a child 
of plaintiff's age is conclusivPly presumPd to be incapable of 
contributory negligence; (:J) that the cviden<'e established that 
the partieular plaintiff was incapable of negligPnce with re-
spect to the accideut in question: (3) that it was proved as a 
matter of law that plaintiff, while cnpable of negligenec, had 
exercised due earp; or ( 4) that, although plaintiff had been 
negligent, lwr laek of care eould not havf) contt'ihutNl to her 
injmy. 
McK. Dig. References: Negligence, § 310; [2-4] Negligence, 
~ 32; Negligence,~ 170; [6] Negligenre, § 246; [7] Independent 
Contractors, §§ 14, 34; Master and Servant, ~ 206; [9] Inde-
pendent Contractors, 833; [10-12] K egligenee, ~ 80; [13] Pires, 
§ 11; [14] X rglig<'neP, § 91; [liJ, 16] Pires, § 1; [17] K egli-
gcnce, § 93. 
[3] 
] 
!d.-Care by 
eare to nvoid thf' (•oeouutered :uHl 
it fnilf'd til due <·an', eontt·ihnting: to th(c 
M'P nonnnlly for the t;·iH of fn,·t io determine. 
is not ns n matter· Ol' la 11· 
Id.-Care by Infant.s.-In an uetion for 
nnd 9-JtwntlHJld gi d wlleu took fit·t· 
frolll live embers of n f\re let't unattell(!l'd ou deCciHi .. 
ants' -where tJH~ evid<'Het~ ·was 
hrr dre~s (·au;.;·ht. ilre because ~he 
tPstimony that another lire lwd been 
on the or beenww she 
embers, a deterlllin:ttion of this conflict \Yas 
as to 1\'ltdht·r 
f1nnH!:1 (Lhel'e 
children 
to resolve o[ the girl's 
her aud of her coutrihutory 
tions could not properly be deeided 
to esereise enn-: i'o1· 
nnd thu,;e ques .. 
as nwtters of law. 
[5] !d.-Questions of I,aw and Fact-Contributory Negligence.-
Coutributory negligenee bears directly on the outemne ot 
suit, and where the facts are in dispute there is no ratiomd 
hnsis for permitting the judge, rather than the jury, to resolve 
that matter. 
[6] Id.-Appeal- Reversible Error- Instructions-Contributory 
Negligence.-·-In an action for injuries sustained hy a :J-yeur 
and 9-month-old girl when her clothing took fire from 
live e!ll hers of a ilre left unattenrlel[ on defendnnts' lot, the 
c·ourt on nppeal rould not disrPganl the effect of an enollPOHS 
instrudion given by the conrt on ib own motion that therP 
was 110 eontrilmtory l!Pgligenz-e, altll'mgh it was 
tlwt this dcfen:e was so defeetively that 
treated as not propPrly in the ease, where 
evidenrr to show t!wt she was not guilty 
gen,;t•, 1d1ere both H''luested iw,tnwtimJs on tlw j,.,JH', 
:md where there wns nothing to sholl' that the ,jpfed in the 
pleadings misled or hindered plaintiff in nny wa.v. 
(7] Independent Contractors-Existence of Rela~tionship.---Tn an 
ad ion for injuries sustainPd by a G-year D!Hl 9 .nwnth-ol1l girl 
when her elothing took fire allegedly frow live ember:; of a fin• 
lei't mwttPJHtPd on defem!nnts' lot. whether a tenant on an 
adjoining Jot by defccnd:mts to do the was au 
independent eontraetor or nn ewployee was a of faet 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, ~ 7fJ; Am.Jur., § 201 
et seq. 
Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Tndepell(lent Contraetor~, ~ 4 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., fndt>pendent ContnH:tors, § G et sPq. 
51 C.2d-15 
re~'nrding 
due n'. 
[9] Independent Contractors--~Liabil.ity of Employer. --The TUle 
linhi(• for an independ<•nt eont1·netor's 
tions ·where nn 
whid1 the 
situa-
he has 
rautinns, eithet 
ho(\il~- iwrm to others 
re t:I ken. Thn Plll]lloyf'l' is liable 
the nh~c'atc o!' sm·li prei'uutions if 
to cl:<f-;ure ohS( 1 1'Y<HltP of the pre-
in the eoHtrad or in some other 
rea~onahle Huumer, or· ii' the 
l~XPn:iscd reasonable care to tnko ~uth 
contrartor has not 
[10}' Negligence-Care Toward Infants.~-.\ ehild trPspasser m-
hy a eondition of the Jtw~· recover if the ease 
comes within ihe rule that n posoc:~soi' of land is suhject to 
liability fnr bo<lily harm to ehildreu irP:<.p<i~,;ing thereon 
cnus(;d by stmcture or othPr nrtineial condition whif'h he 
mainbius on the if the phcc 
1r1niutained is oue (!U whjeh tl1e 
lmow that childn:n are 
v:lien; the ('O!Hlition is 
m· should 
and the condi-
tion is one of which tl>c possessor kncnv,, or should know and 
whieh he or should n:alil:c as um·easonahle 
harm Lo slH:h and 
of 
tion or rt.}alize the risk involved 
com ~within the nren made 
to the possPssor of 
to the risk to children. 
[11] Id.-Care Toward Infants.--The 
toward children extends to 
lS as 
possessor of land 
conditions which, 
§ 20; Am.Jur., 
Feb. 
[13] 
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to young ehildren would 
of Law and Fact.~In an 
evidence thnt a. tPnant on nn 
burning did some in the center of defendants' lot on 
the morning of the at about 11 a. m. to return 
to his home after (::1eeordin;?: to his he put out the 
fire with a came on the lot ubout 8:30 p. m. 
on the im·itntion ot the temmt's that the fire wns still 
that another .fire had 
been started near the front of the lot by the tenant's son, and 
that the ·with this 
a factual issue was presented 
county ordinance it 
unlawful to leave an outdoor or open fire unattended unless lw 
should thoroughly it in sueh manner as to prevent 
hut the violation of another ordinance 
the burning uule~s the person so first secures a permit, 
does the between 6 and 10 a. m., or does the burning 
within an established camp site could be showu as a math!r of 
law where none o£ these would be 
[14] Negligence-Violation of Statute-Rebuttal of Presumption. 
-IV here a statute is intended to the class of persons 
in which the of tl1e type of 
the stntute rise to 
may be rebutted evi-
ordinances 
an open fire unattended wit11out first 
it and Jlrohibiting such burning nn-
452 CouRTELL v. McEAcHa"' [51 C.2d 
it procures a and does the 
hours, or the burning takes place within the 
established camp site were intended to pro-
the of fire but all 
from fires not 
the possessor 
[16] Id.-Statutes and Ordinances.--The person who is 
for the burning of an open fire is by county ordinances 
nn!avYful the fire unattended without thor-
it and to do the burning without a permit 
certain hours. with that un-
reasonable harm are pres~nted by the 
to be prevented, including dangers to trespassing chil-
dnm from conditions not obvious to them, and a 
violation of the ordinances would, absent a of 
cation or excnse, rise to a presumption of m•gligence if 
the were to find against defendants on the questions 
,..,.,,.,.u11w existence of concealed risk and knowledge of use of 
defendants' lot (on which the burning was done) by children. 
[17] Negligence- Violation of Statutes or Ordinances. In an 
action for sustained by a 5-yenr and 9-month-old girl 
when her took fire allegedly from live embers of a fire 
left unattended on defendants' lot, a presumption of negli-
gence from burning, by the person engaged to do it, 
in violation of county ordinances could not form a basis of 
liability unless the violation proximately caused plaintiff's 
and there would be a question in this connection as to 
whether the accident resulted from the fire started by the 
person to do the burning or a second fire assertedly 
by his son. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Frederick F. Houser, ,Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for burns sustained by a girl whose 
fire allegedly from live embers of a fire left 
unattended on defendants' lot. Judgment for plaintiff re-
versed. 
l'vfnrehison & R. Bruce Murchison and Warren 
D. Allen for Appellants. 
and the ad-
in the amount of: 
fot" severe burns :;;he ;.:ustained while 
owned hy the l\1eEaehens in 
A house had been torn down on the lot \Yhrre 
and early in 1953 1\Ir. 
the rral property of the 
burn the lumber and whieh c.overed the lot. Plummer, 
an worker in a tire , was tenant of 
the M(·Eaehens, a house n0xt to thr lot. aml h(• 
to do tlw burning for on0 mm1th's free rent. MeEm·hrn told 
him that he could burn a little raeb between 9 :00 a. m. and 
] 0 :30 or 11 :00 a. m., and for several 
Jst he lmnwd some debris at the l'l'ntrr of 
1 he lot. On February ]] , the of the Plummer 
did some burning in this mannrr and left the lot about 11 :00 
a.m., returning to his home. 
About 2::30 p. m. on J<'rhruary 11, a 5 years 
and 9 months old, was walking home from school. Srveml 
ehildren, among them two daughters and a son of Plummer, 
were playing on the lot, and one of them called to plaintiff to 
join them. A woman ·who saw the accident from her home 
nearby testified that plaintiff walked to the center of the 
Jot, jumped oyer ~:>omcthing and " dowu" and that, 
when plaintiff got up, the bade of her drrss was on fire. The 
witness had observed the lot from the time that Plummer 
started the fin· in the morJJing, and she stateu that, when the 
accident happenc>d, the fire was still although 
there were no flames. 
The court determined that plaintiff >nts capable of being a 
witness, and she testified that her dress caught fire when, 
having gone to the center of the lot and having jumped over 
a pile of wood, she squatted do·wn to pick up a stiek. She 
further said that there were no flames on the lot, that there 
was a little smoke in the eenter and embers on the ground, 
including a 6-inch pile under some wood, that she did not 
know embers eould burn her or set her dress on fire, and that 
she knew of fire only from her mother's stove. 
Aceording to one of Plummer's daughters, her brother had 
started a fire near the front of the lot, and, when plaintiff 
came onto the lot, the children were playing with that fire, 
which was about 15 inehes high. Both plaintiff and the wit-
''red eoals.'' 
to the 
that children 
was shown 
a statement to the conirnr.v in her 
to Plnmmcr, knew that hie:; c:hilc1rcn and 
on lot af'H'l' the house had been torn down, 
M"Eaclwn had Yisited him on some oceasiom; when 
the dJildrc:a there. 
Defendants iir:-;t of an instrndion by 
the L:OlEt on its mva that there \\'as uo contributory 
'l'lwrc are four theories 
an instruetion: (1) 
presumed to 
that the: evidence 
with respect to 
of such 
ion; (3) that 
us a matter of law, that 
had excreised due: care; or 
had been her lad' of c·are 
although 
could not have 
nry. None of the;;e 
of the instrnl'iion in this case. 
\Ylwther a r:hild wafi 
tile 
ol' exercis-
eneoUJ1 tercel and 
io detcrmiue. 
J J:W l1:l8 P. 712] .) 
(•ourts have l'l' the 
, hciiYCl'll fin' ancl 
due tare, thereby 
for the triPr of faet 
167 Cal. 
as a maHer of Jaw. v. , 8"1 CaL\pp. 
2d 361, 370 P.2d ; Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd., 
6 Cnl.App.2d 304 P.2d .) [4] 'l'he cYidPnee 
was eonfiicting as to ·whether plaintiff";; dress eanght :fire 
455 
be~:am;e she 
Oll 
a 
dis<.:rction of trial to refer 
to the as to whether the negli-
gence of children of the of years or under sueh as 
to preveut tbPir reeoYery .... " In that ease, howeyer, the 
trial had llOt dec·ided the iswe of negli-
gence but had submitted it to the the c.asc on its 
facts docs not support and the quoted 
language should not be eonsi rued in the manner 
[5] is a matter bearing directly 
Wl in the present case, 
there is no rational basis for per-
mitting the rather than the jur;r, to resolve that matter. 
So far as has bPeu called to our the exisknco of 
such an 
[lb] 
gence on tbe part of 
of a defem;o upon whieh 
tiff has not raised tho 
error is not prejudicial defense ·was 
so c1efectively that it must Le treated as not 
in the case. Ho\Yever, tlwre is in the record to sbow, 
and tiff dors not no\v that tlle defect in the 
and she introrhwcd 
been matn·ial to her 
ory 
ilwt there no flamt'S on the that 
kttow enthPrs l'Otll<l bet· set lll'r dresc: on and that 
she kllew of fire from her mother's :;;toYe. On appeal she 
has not sPen fit io ltWntion the dc•fec·t and argnPs only that the 
C.2d 
must be re-
which should be discussed 
'l'hc determination 
contractor or an 
of various factors, 
the most of which is the of control retained 
the MeEaehens. Star 2vlincs Co. v. California 
Com., 28 CaL2J 43-44 [168 P.2d 686].) 'fhe evi-
dence now before us is inconclusive in regard to this factor 
since it appears that McEachcn gave only a few instructions 
and did not the burning but that Plummer would 
additional instruetions had been given. 
eircumstances are also conflicting in their 
Plummer was paid by the job, rather than 
but burning was not his usual oeeupation. On 
the as to whether Plummer was an 
or an iudepemlent contractor is one of fact. 
[8] Obviously, if Plummer was an employee, defendants 
'nmld be liable for any conduct on his part which, in view 
of his use of the lot by children, would 
eonstitute a lack of due care. \Ye do not mean to suggest, 
hmYever, that there could be no liability if it should be found 
that Plummer was in independent contractor. [9] The rule 
that an is not liable for an independent contractor's 
negligence is subject to numerous exceptions, including the 
ones set forth in seetions 418 and 416 of the Restatement of 
'roris. v. Empt·css Theatre Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 4, 
·>section 413 of the Restatement of Torts provides: 
''One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the 
should recognize as creating dnring its progress, 
cu11wucmo containing an unreasonable of bodily harm to others unless 
arc taken, is to liability for bodily harm 
them by tile abscnee of precautions; if the employer (a) 
in the contract that contractor shall take snch pre-
cantions to which see § 416), or fails to exercise reasonable care 
to provide in some other manner for taking of such precautions.'' 
Section 416 of the Restatement of Torts provides: 
nn independent contractor to do work, which the 
recognize as necessarily requiring the creation during 
eondition 
457 
v. Sonthern Cal. Edison 
P.2d 912]; llnell v. 39 Cal.2d 
) Those sections relate to a situation 
to do work 
others precautions are taken. 
the for an injury caused 
preeautions if he has failed to take steps to 
oh~crvauee of the precautions, either a proVIsiOn in 
the contract or in some other reasonable manner (§ 413), or 
if the eontraetor has not exercised reasonable care 
(§ 416). It is to be noted that the 
sections 
the existence of a risk to others, so that a showing of such 
must be made regardless of what the independent 
eontraetor may have known. 
Another question is whether plaintiff, who undoubtedly has 
a cause of action if she was injured by active operations and 
·was a licensee v. Stewart, 24 CaL2d 133, 136 
[148 P.2d 156 A.I.1.R. 1221]; Rest., Torts, § 341), has no 
eause of aetion if she was injured by a condition of the prem-
ises and was a trespasser. [10] A child trespasser injured by 
a condition of the premises may recover if the case eomes 
within the rule set forth in section 339 of the Restatement 
of and, of course, a child licensee thus injured has 
at least an equal right of recovery Prosser on 'rorts (2d 
e>d. 1955) pp. 450, 438-440; Rest., Torts, § 342 and comment 
(b) Section 339 reads: ''A possessor of land is 
to liability for bodily harm to young children trcs-
thereou caused by a structure or other artifieial condi-
tion vvhieh he maintains upon the land, if (a) the place where 
the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor 
knovvs or should know that such children are likely to trespass, 
and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or 
should lmow and which he realizes or should realize as in-
an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm 
to sueh and (c) the children because of their youth 
do not discover the eondition or realize the risk involved in 
in it or in coming within the area made danger-
its progress of a condition involving a peculiar risk of bodily harm to 
otllns nnkss speci:ll prceantions un' tak<'H, is snlljert to liability for 
bodily lmnn eaused to tLcm hy the f:1ilure of tlJC <'Ontractor to exercise 
n:asonn b!e care to take such precautions.'' 
oi (·hil<leeu." 
However, does not extend to ''those condi lions I he 
of whieh is ohvions even io ehildren and the risk o 
realized them." ., § L:Olllmcnt . ) 
[12] Ou the basis of the rcc:onlnow before us, different infer-
ences could he drawn to the ehanwtcr of en-
eountered and it ·would he for the trier of fact 
to determine whether she \Yas a risk not obvious 
to her. 'l'he ·whether the concealed if it 
should han; hceu au unreason-
two eounty fire ordinances 
lish defendants' 
Yiew of 
rstab-
Seetion 1813 of Ordinauce No. 2947 "It shall 
be unlawful to or eause or to be any outdoor 
or opeu fire unattended by an adult person, or such person 
or persons as may be requin'd in issnec1 for any sueh 
fire by the County Fire \Varden. any sud1 
fire, sueh person or per;,ons in 
onghly fmme by it with 
satut'at ing it with water, or it in sneh a 
manner to preyent of sneh fire.'' 
Section 1301 of Onlinan(·e No. whieh also relates 
to open that a person slw.ll not or eanse 
or permit to be any eomlmstible matP1·ial unless 
be first seeurcs a 1wrmit to do so, or (h) the is done 
in Rmall bc'h\·een 6 :00 a. m. and 10 :00 
distmH·es from lmi or otllee eomlmstiblc ma-
terial, and is attended at aU times an adult 
gnishing , or (e) the takes 
bountlaries of an est a bliRhed eamp site.'~ 
·'Sec·tion 1301 o[ Orrl innncc ::\ o .. !;>~0 
'• Open J;':ircs·-~-Lonrs of 
tnlu, or cau8z~ OT pennit to l~e 
outdoor :fire, use, or tatlSC' or p~·rmit 
provldes: 
shall 11ot huil<l, light, 
or nudntainell, nny open or 
nscd, any fire for eleal'i11g ]an(1, 
CouRTELr~ JHcEACHEN 
arca of 
a trespasser. It may 
of Ordinanee No. 5520 
459 
for open fires makes dear that 
O!ll~ 
hO'-H'VN', that the 
to issuance of permits 
the fire ~warden is to consider 
of fire ''or·' the proteetion 
arise fro1n 
is0s where 
of the 
the reasonable construction to be 
that not only 
is clone. 
all 
eontrollcd or extin-
ou the prem-
undoubtedly 
lmrn or to ],c hnrned, any 
{lr other c·on1lrustihlc materint 
"(a) secnres from the County ]'ire 
so to 
Fnitl'<l States J•'orcst Sorviec of\\cer having """'~''H'" 
is in one or 1noTo snudl heaps or ·where the 
or plowed 
any \YOOclbnd, 
or other J1nmmahle 
in :u•tnal nttendanee 
is within the boundaries of any established camp 
l:llG.'' 
460 CouRTELL v. McEACHE:::<r C.2d 
extends to licensees on those and there is no reason 
to conclude that it does not also extend to child trespassers to 
\Yhom a of care is owed undrr the rule set forth in 
339 of the Restatement of rrorts. [16] The perSOll 
Pvu;,un.co for the lS the ordinancrs 
existence of a concealed risk and 
of use of the lot by children. 
[17] 1\. of negligence arising from 
Plummer in violation of the ordinances could not form a basis 
of liability, of course, unless the violation caused 
plaintiff's injuries. There would be a in this connec-
tion as to whether the accident resulted from the fire started 
Plummer or a second fire assertedly lighted 
The judgment is reversed. 
and Traynor, J., concurred. 
his son. 
SPENCE, ,J., Coneurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
reversal of the judgment upon the principal stated 
for reversal in the main opinion. It is there 
that '' 'l'he instruction that there \Vas no negli-
gence erroneously deprived ch~fendants of a defense upon 
which had relied .... In these we are not 
justified in disregarding the effect of the erroHeous instruc-
tion, and, since the error was dearly to 
the judgment must be reversed.'' 
from the vicvvs expressed in the main opinion upon the more 
fundamental questions involved on this Further-
more, I am of the opinion that the reversal should be accom-
panied with directions to the trial c·ourt to enter in 
favor of defendants. 
'rhis is one of a series of re<:\'JJt the ques-
tion of the nature of the duty owed by the landowner to the 
child. My views on this 
at some length in my dissenting 
Willson, pp. 94, 106 [:331 P.2d 
repeated here. But of the 
in the Reyllolds 
views 
dear that 
461 
obvious risk of 
dJild 
other children or contact 
bu~lt in the middle of tlw 
It may also be conceded that con-
could be drawn as to whether Plummer 
or an independellt contractor. But even if 
inferences are resolved in favor of 
of liability here appears to be wholly incon-
w·hieh limit the type 
may be imposed upon the landowner 
child. 
's tPstimouy, it showed that while she 
"she saw "live embers" and "smoke'' 
th0refrom. Her explanation of her rash aet in squat-
down there was that she had nrver seen "live embers" 
beforr. 'l'hc fact remains, however, that any ritik whieh she 
encountered was a common, obvious risk of fire. To intimate, 
as does the main opinion, that the risk described by plaintiff 
could be found the trier of fact to be a ''concealed'' 
or a '' hidr!eu' or'' masked'' risk as required by the authorities, 
to in a c·ontradiction of terms. No risk can be more 
eommon or more obvious than the risk presentrd by the orcli-
nary trash fire built upon the surface of the ground. Such was 
the risk here under any view of the evidenee. 
to note that the main opinion does not 
case whieh has imposed liability upon the land-
owner to the trespassing ehild under similar cireumstanees. 
On the other hand, the great weight of authority supports 
the view that no liability should be imposed here. (Moon v. 
97 Cal.App.2d 717 [218 P.2d 550] ; Dunbar v. OliL·ieri, 
97 Colo. 381 P.2d 64]; Paolino v. McXendall, 24 R.I. 432 
1L 96 Am.St.Hep. 786, 60 hRA. 133]; Fitzmaurice 
v. Connccticul R. & L. Co., 78 Conn. 406 [62 £1. 620, 112 Am. 
159, 3 L.RA. N.S. 149] ; Ame1~ican Advertising & 
Bill Posting Co. v. Flannigan, 100 Ill.App. 452; Erickson v. 
Oreal Northern Ry. 82 Miun. 60 [84 N.W. 462, 83 Am. 
410, i51 L.RA. 645]; Coleman v. Robert Graves Co., 39 
192; 27 A.L.R2c1 1!87, 
Some of the fire as well ot hrr cases, 
involved violations of ordinances but such violations 
deemed material the like the 
were 
ehildren. As 
ing to 
concerned.'' 
insofar as the 
'rhc main does not discuss the above-cited cases or 
any of the dceisions of the court::; of this state 
>vith the fundamental involved. It quotes 
scetion 339 of the HesLatrment of Torts like the dissent-
ing in 48 Cal.2d 785 r312 
P.2d 1089], equates its with mere "lack of: due 
care.'' Thus the main upon the laudmvncr a 
duty the child which is measured pre-
the same standard as the owed thC' landowner 
to a child \dlO a business i1rdtee. The of such 
don Y. 
Polk v. 
P. .) 
decisions in this state. 
Cal.2c1 778; Mclnulcz 
P.:2d 971] ; 
56 
The reading of these authorities demonstrates the 
that would 
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the landownrr toward the 
eonvclltional terms "laek of due 
it ap1wars that thr landowner's 
and then 
addr>d burden of 
ehildren from 
situation i::; 
that 
the !-
where a defendant who wail 
~was with some new aet of 
ured pen;ou had entered the:·eon (Ycunauchi 
703 P .~d ) , no authorities 
whic·h hold that the ein·nmstanees of th•; 
fall within its scope. An.v risk of harm 
the leaving of the in t1w 
such leaving 
' as distinguished from ''ac-tive 
of the doetrine. Th0re is 
fact to be determined whi\'11 could 
supra, 
the eonfusion 
Sneh confusion will become worse confounded 
there. 
of 
the main here. Both opinions m·c to 
the eom;truetion that this eonrt is now, sub 
the 
i 11e 
the former cases" as was advocated in 
v. J[aiscr 
arc lilmwise 
that this court uow, in 
, 
upon seetion 339 of the 
135 
no nw11tion '\Yhaten'r- is 
of the c·ase in the main 
the hf'neh and bar ~will stil1 be 
npon this eonrt's Yiews th<' 
proper eonstnwtion of seet ion 389 of the Restat0m01lt of 
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'forts 
cases 
As indicated in my dissent m Rc 
pp. 106 P.2d 
of the Hcstatem(•nt of 
consistent with ''the former cases.'' 
supra, 48 Cal.2d 778; lJlel( 
supNt, Cal.2d 7 41; 
477.) Ou the other 
to whether 
in the case or the maiil 
be rcL:oneiled with those decision;;:. I am iu aecon] with Dean 
Prosser's version of the proper eonstrudion of section 
where he states: "'l'here are some common in tlh: 
which any child of sufficient age to be allowl'tl 
may be expected to undC>rstand and 
as the usual risks of fire and water, ... '' on 
2d p. 441.) 'rlwre is no evid0nee in the record before us 
which shows anything more than the "usual'' risk of fire. 
it is not suggested that more could be 
shown on a retrial of the cause. 
I ·would therefore reverse the judgment and would accom-
pauy such reversal with directions to the trial eourt to enter 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 
Schauer, J., and McComb, ,J., coneurred. 
CAHTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! agree with 
that portion of the majority opinion whieh determiues the 
issue of liability of the defendants in this ease lmt 
with the discussion and the eondusion with rt>speet to the issue 
of contributory negligence of the plaintiff, Donna Jean 
Courtell. 
From my examination of the reeord in this ease it appt>ars 
dear that contributory negligenee i,; not an issue for the 
following reasons: Pirst, there is no 1mffieient 
in the answer of any of the defendants to raise an issue of 
of any of the plaintiffs. 
there is no basis for the conclusion that the issue of ,•outribu-
tory is available to defendants ber•aw;e no 
was offered on this issue and the ease was not tried upon the 
that contributory was an issue. The record 
discloses that all of the testimony offered ou behalf of 
tiff was testimony relating to hc•r conduet, whieh neces-
sarily a part of her ease in chief. 
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above it is not 
to detc~rminc in this case ·whether the trial 
discretion in as a matter of law that Donna 
,Jean CourieU was not of care to avoid 
the encountered by her whieh resulted m 
she eould not, therefore, be of 
rule, a defendant must 
of the plaintiff in ord('I' to 
v. 9 
Bcck11cr, 
v. Smrthern Pew. Co., 84 
But where plaintiff'~; 
gcnee appears from the allegations of the or evi-
dence introduced in his the defense is available to the 
defendant not pleaded in his answer. (Green v. 
Southern rae. Co., 1:12 Cal. 254 [64 P. 2fi5]; Ilall City & 
San 188 Cal. 641 [206 P. 
supra, 9 Cal.App. 350.) Another 
rule 0xists where it appears from tlw record 
the issue of contributory negligence was actually and 
tried by the introduction of pertinent 
is sho\\'11 that the parties 
in sm·h trial if the issue had been made 
v. 88 Cal. 221, 227 [26 P. 
49 Cal.2<1 397, 400-401 P.2d 1].) 
set forth the fads on ·whieh the d(•fense of 
is predicated and 11ot merely state 
466 C.2d 
of 
rrwth Chcrnnel Gold 1ilin. 
"It is not necessary to use the 
a concise s/alcmcnt of the 
the connnission or omission acts which tcould 
similar c1:rcmnsiances in the exercise 
which would appear to conlrilmtc to the 
must be to 
to exist it IS at the 
very least v. 
180 ~ 
Loitilo, 6 Cal.2d 363, 367 P.2d ), awl some cases have 
held that a general demurrer should be sustained v. 
Habra, 126 Cal.App. 476, 47fl P.2d 1055]; Callaway v. 
128 Cal.App. 166, 16fl P.2d ) . 
Applying these rules to the case at the for 
determination is IYhether defendant's in his second 
special defense constitute an of contributory 
negligence. If not then the demurrer to this defense should 
have been sustained or the motion to strike the same should 
have been granted. .B'or the rea~ons stated below it appears 
that the allegations contained in this pleading are insuffkie11t 
to state a valid plea of contributory 
The plea reads in part "That if in fact plaintiffs ... were 
injured ... then said injuries and damages, if any ... are 
due to the negligence and careleGsness of the plaintiffs ... 
and that said negligence and carelessness ... 
and concurrently eontributed to and brought about whatevc•r 
injuries and damages plaintiffs ... may have sustained.'' 
It is at once evident in reading this pleading that there are 
no facts ineluded therein tLdt indicate the commission or 
omission of acts \Yhieh 1vould be ref1nired of one under similar 
cin:mnstances in the exereisc of care and whieh 
would appear to contribute to the 
of. Pailun: to any faC't or fads from whi<:h the 
gcnee oecmTecl renders the nt fatal (Church v. Head-
rick & Brown, 101 Cal ; PotterY. 
Richards, 1:32 Cal.App.2d 380 P.2d 113]) for thr reason 
that there is a failure to show a causal conncetion between 
shou1(1 be 
467 
whiell 
igent 
w!Jen dcfl'mhnt 
v Southern Pace 
ae1 
a (·ausnl 
for 1ras denied 1\Iareh 
the opinion that the petition 
[h A. No. 25107. In Bank. Feb. 2, l9;)!J.] 
I1EO D. lL\PT', et al., 
[1] Public Officers-- Compensation- Increasing Compensation.-
Under Gov. § 53071, the constitutioual pro-
VlSIOn increase of an compensation after 
his election or during· his term of art. XI, \i 5) 
·'time of war" and Gov. Code, § ;'53070, "war" 
as that of time when declares or when 
the armed forces of tlle United 
power, ·whether or not 
ending one year after 
by the Presi-
Jnn. '7, 19.);), declaring· 
the termination of Korcnn hostilities aml .Jnn. 31, 
195i5, as the date of termination of combatant in the 
Korrnn conflict fulfllled the of 
constitutionnl awl ~tatntory though 
purpose >vas to iPnn innte certain veteran henPfits, the suspen-
s-ion of the salary iner<"flS('S tennjnated 
on J ~n;ar after the presidPntial declaration of 
tenniuation o[ and a eount:v salary onliuance of 
DeePlnber 31, 19:i7, the of incumbent 
e!ediYe offierrs of the county did nut lwcome Plfedive until 
nl'trr tllcir tnms on .January 5, 19;)9~ 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Public § 174. 
McK. Dig. Reference: Public Oftlcers, § 110(1). 
